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Abstract: Thanks to advancements in smart mobile devices and social media platforms, sharing photos and experiences has
significantly bridged the authors’ lives, allowing them to stay connected despite distance and other barriers. Most approaches to
protect image visual privacy focus on encrypting or permuting image data, which generate unreadable image or highly distorted
visual effect and therefore may not be in users best interest from both usage and perception perspectives. In this study, the
authors propose secure JPEG transmorphing, a framework for protecting image visual privacy in a secure, reversible, and
highly flexible and personalised manner. Secure JPEG transmorphing allows one to apply arbitrary regional visual manipulation
on image regions of interests (ROIs), while secretly preserving the information about the original ROIs in application segments
(APPn markers) of the visually obfuscated JPEG image. Objective and subjective experiments have been performed and results
indicate that the proposed protection scheme provides near lossless image reconstruction, controllable level of file size
expansion, good degree of privacy protection and especially better subjective pleasantness.
1 Introduction
The number of images shared from mobile devices has reached
scales which were unimaginable only a decade ago: Every day over
two billion images are posted to Online Social Networks (OSNs) or
exchanged through instant messaging and cloud-based sharing
services. However, advancements of photo sharing have also raised
concerns for privacy, as photos potentially reveal great amount of
sensitive information about people. OSN sites usually offer a
limited degree of privacy protection and the most common solution
is just conditional access. Researchers in the field of image
processing and media security have proposed various approaches
to enable photo privacy, most of which focus on encrypting or
permuting the entire image data. From data security point of view,
an encryption-based scheme can protect privacy in a highly secure
and reversible manner. However, simply encrypting an entire
image may significantly affect the usability of photo sharing and
may not be in users interest from both usage and perception
perspectives. In many cases, people seek simple and intuitive
solutions to share their photos online to public while partially
protecting specific regions in an image, e.g. creating an anonymous
face with a cartoon smiley, blurring or inpainting sensitive areas.
Yet, all those interesting manipulations cannot be reversed directly.
Inspired by these facts, we attempt to explore novel solutions to
protect image visual privacy in not only secure and reversible but
also intuitive and pleasant ways.
In this paper, we present secure JPEG transmorphing, a novel
framework for JPEG (Joint Photographic Experts Group)
compression. Within secure JPEG transmorphing, most types of
regional visual obfuscations can be applied, such as masking,
blurring, pixelation, inpainting and warping. More importantly, the
original image can be reconstructed with near lossless quality, even
if the protected image has been manipulated. Objective
experiments were conducted to evaluate the performance of the
proposed method with respect to its reconstruction quality and
storage overhead. Moreover, we also investigate the privacy
protection capability and users pleasantness of different regional
image obfuscations via a set of subjective experiments via online
crowdsourcing.
The remaining of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2
presents related works. Section 3 describes in detail the working
principle of the proposed protection framework. Then Sections 4
and 5 report the objective and subjective experiments, respectively.
Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Related work
Early-stage privacy protection mainly aims at enabling the visual
privacy in video surveillance. The methods include image
pixelation, masking, blurring [1, 2], scrambling [3], warping [4],
and morphing [5]. With the rapid development of online social
networks and photo sharing services, protecting privacy especially
for online photos has raised great challenges. A number of research
efforts focused on the design of access control mechanisms such
that photos or data shared online can be only accessed by a selected
group of people [6–10]. However, most existing access control
systems are far from adequate, which could lead to severe
information leakage when the OSN cannot apply the access control
polices correctly, or if users fail to understand the complex privacy
settings.
Another category of schemes to protect privacy in online
images aim at encrypting or permuting the image data, before
uploading and sharing them on OSN. The encryption or
permutation can be performed in different domains, e.g. image
pixels, bitstream, or discrete cosine transform (DCT) coefficients.
Poller et al. [11] propose a robust image obfuscation, by permuting
pixel blocks and modulating channel intensity. However, its
security against different types of attacks is not clearly known and
the permuted images could still reveal a certain degree of visual
information. Ra et al. [12] propose P3, a photo privacy protection
algorithm based on JPEG coding, which splits an image into a
public part and a private part, with the public portion shared via
OSN and private portion secretly stored in a storage server.
However, P3 could disclose rich visual information in its public
image when the threshold value is not small enough and its
introduction of an additional cloud server complicates the file
management system. Tierney et al. [13] propose a system named
Cryptagram, which enables users to encrypt photos with traditional
block ciphers and embed the encrypted bitstream into a JPEG file.
However, this method creates a significant storage overhead due to
the use of a cover image. Sun et al. [14] propose a privacy-aware
regions of interest (ROI) image encryption scheme named Privacy-
aware ROI Image Encryption based on logistical mapping and data
hiding. The PRIE scheme utilises salient object detection to detect
privacy-sensitive regions of an image. After encrypting pixels in
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the private ROI using chaotic cryptography, the significant bits are
embedded into the non-privacy region using data hiding. In
addition, various approaches have been proposed to secure JPEG
image based on DCT-domain encryption or scrambling. Yuan et al.
[15, 16] propose a scrambling scheme that randomly changes the
signs of DCT coefficients to enable image visual privacy. Recently,
He et al. [17] proposed PUPPIES, a design and implementation of
a partial image sharing technique, based on DCT-domain
perturbation, which allows users to stipulate specific private image
regions and correspondingly set different policies for each user.
Other studies include [18, 19], both encrypting DCT coefficients
with different schemes. Many of the solutions mentioned above
support the protection of regional image information but some not,
e.g. P3. However, all those solutions for protecting image visual
privacy stay in the stage of encrypting or permuting image data, in
either entire image or ROIs, which results in highly distorted visual
effect with poor image quality. It may not be in users’ best interest
to see and use such methods to protect their own privacy, in
particularly in the scenario of online social media. Yet, the impact
of visual obfuscations on users’ perception and usage preference
has not been well studied nor understood.
3 Secure JPEG transmorphing: the framework
The working principle of secure JPEG transmorphing is to utilise
JPEG application segments (APPn marker) to secretly preserve
regional original image information, while encoding or transcoding
the original image in a visually obfuscated form. The visual
information can be protected by any type of regional image
manipulation, e.g. masking, blurring, pixelation, inpainting and
warping. The protected image, or called transmorphed image, of
the same structure as standard JPEG, is backwards compatible with
JPEG. With a dedicated JPEG transcoder or decoder that supports
JPEG transmorphing, the original image can be recovered by
replacing the obfuscated regions in the protected image with the
corresponding original regions hidden in JPEG APPn markers.
3.1 Transmorphing protection
The protection procedure of secure JPEG transmorphing consists
of three steps: (i) mask matrix generation, (ii) sub-image
construction and (iii) transmorphing data insertion. Fig. 1
illustrates an example protection procedure for reader's easier
understanding. 
3.1.1 Mask matrix generation: Firstly, user obfuscates certain
ROIs of a given image using arbitrary regional manipulation, such
as masking face regions with cartoon stickers as example images in
Fig. 1. Upon the obfuscation applied, a binary-valued two-
dimensional matrix is generated, which specifies the shape, size
and position of protected ROIs. Each element of the matrix
corresponds to a Minimum Coded Unit block of the upcoming
encoded JPEG image, where elements 1 indicate protected blocks
and 0 unprotected. This matrix is called Mask Matrix, noted as M,
which holds essential geometrical information about the image
ROIs being protected. Depending on applications, the mask matrix
can be generated either from geometrical information of user
actions (e.g. coordinates of finger touch on mobile phone), or by
comparing the original and obfuscated images. This step is
presented in Algorithm 1 ( see Fig. 2). 
3.1.2 Sub-image construction: Secondly, a sub-image ISub is
constructed by encoding or transcoding the original image to a new
JPEG image, during which DCT coefficients corresponding to the
ROIs defined by M are preserved while other coefficients outside
the ROIs are set to zero. The sub-image is still a JPEG image with
the same dimensions but smaller file size as the original image. It
contains information about the original image ROIs to be
protected. This procedure is presented in Algorithm 2 (see Fig. 3). 
3.1.3 Transmorphing data insertion: Lastly, ISub is secured by a
symmetric encryption scheme with a secret key, e.g. the Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES) [20] or JPEG scrambling [15]. The
bytestream of the encrypted sub-image CSub, the mask matrix M,
along with certain metadata, collectively called Transmorphing
data, is then inserted into a set of application segments of the
obfuscated JPEG image; in this respect, the obfuscated image
serves as a ‘cover image’. Here we encode the binary-valued mask
matrix into a bitstream, with each bit representing an element of M.
The metadata contains the auxiliary information about the inserted
sub-image and mask matrix, such as the data length and the
encryption scheme and parameters applied. Since JPEG allows a
maximum of 65, 533 bytes [Each APP marker signals its marker
length with two bytes (16 bits), resulting in (216 − 1) − 2 = 65, 533
bytes to record extra information.] allocated for each marker
segment, the sub-image data very likely needs to be separately
stored in several APPn segments. In our current implement, APP11
markers are used for signalling transmorphing data. This step is
described in Algorithm 3 (see Fig. 4) and the syntax of a
transmorphed image file is shown in Fig. 5. 
Fig. 1  Protection procedure of secure JPEG transmorphing
 
Fig. 2  Algorithm 1. GenerateMaskMatrix (IO,P)
 
Fig. 3  Algorithm 2. ConstructSubImage (IO,M)
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Overhead control (optional): Inserting additional information in
protected image increases image file size and we therefore propose
a simple mechanism to adjust such overhead by reducing the file
size of the final transmorphed image based on DCT coefficients
requantisation. To be more specific, we dequantise the DCT
coefficients of the obfuscated ROIs in IP and then requantise them
with a new quality factor (noted as QF). The requantised DCT
coefficients along with other original coefficients of unprotected
ROIs are finally entropy-coded. DCT requantisation usually
decreases image quality and reduces image file size, which has
been identified and well explained in [21]. We just make use of
such a ‘side effect’ of DCT requantisation to decrease the quality
and data volume of the obfuscated regions presented in the ‘cover
image’ IP, further reducing the file size of transmorphed image.
3.2 Transmorphing reconstruction
The reconstruction procedure aims at recovering the original image
from a transmorphed image, by reversing the above transmorphing
protection operations: extracting CSub and M from inserted
transmorphing data, decrypting CSub to get ISub and replacing the
obfuscated ROIs in IP with corresponding information in ISub.
Since the inserted mask matrix and sub-image preserves the
complete information about the original image corresponding to
the protected ROIs, the protected image is robust to most image
transformations. However, we assume that applied transformations
do not remove the inserted data in JPEG header, and that the
transformation is a known operation that can be re-applied. The
replacement process can be done in either frequency (DCT
coefficient) or spatial (pixel) domain depending on the
transformation applied to the transmorphed image. The Algorithm
4 (see Fig. 6) presents the reconstruction procedure of secure JPEG
transmorphing. 
4 Objective performance evaluation
Image reconstructed from a reversible protection scheme is
expected to be identical or highly similar to the original image. File
size expansion due to inserted transmorphing data causes extra
storage overhead, which should be as low as possible in practice. In
this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed secure
JPEG transmorphing, in regard to the quality of reconstructed
image and the storage overhead introduced. The evaluation was
carried out in comparison with another JPEG-based algorithm, P3
[12].
4.1 Image dataset
The People In Photo Albums (PIPA) dataset [22] is used in our
experiments. This is a dataset containing over 60,000 JPEG images
of more than 2000 individuals collected from public Flickr photo
albums. Each image of the dataset has ground truth head positions
(rectangle) of several individuals annotated. We randomly selected
a subset of 1500 images with the same size of 1204 × 768 pixels
from the dataset and use this subset in our experiments [The subset
used in this study is available at http://grebvm2.epfl.ch/lin/thesis/
dataset/PIPA-subset-1500.zip]. In addition to the ground truth
Head region, we consider two more ROIs as protection target: (i)
the Full-body region, 3 × head width and 6 × head height, with
head at the top centre of the full body and (ii) the Upper-body
region, upper-half of the full body rectangle.
Fig. 4  Algorithm 3. InsertTransmorphingData (IP,M, ISub,C,K)
 
Fig. 5  Syntax of a JPEG transmorphing protected image
 
Fig. 6  Algorithm 4. RecoverTransmorphing (IP,T( ⋅ ),K)
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4.2 Reconstruction quality
We applied secure JPEG transmorphing on an individual's three
ROIs, respectively, in each image, and P3 on the entire image with
a threshold of 5 (note that standard P3 only supports entire image
protection). For secure JPEG transmorphing, we applied visual
masking with a smiley sticker. Since spatial-domain masking
operation involves JPEG decoding and re-encoding, which affects
the quality of reconstructed images, we encoded the Transmorphed
images with the maximal JPEG quality factor of 100 to minimise
such impact. We applied four different transformations on each
protected image and then executed the reconstruction process for
each protected image without or with transformation applied. The
four transformations are
• Scaling (Sc.): Subsample image by factor of 2 on both
directions.
• Cropping (Cr.): Crop image to get centre region of size 512×
384.
• Compression (Co.): Recompress image in JPEG with QF 70.
• Rotation (Ro.): Rotate image by 90∘ in clockwise direction with
a JPEG transcoder.
For P3, image transformations were applied on both public and
secret portions. We use peak signal-to-noise ratio (PSNR) and
structural similarity index (SSIM) [23] to examine the quality of
reconstructed image as compared to the original image. For scaled
or cropped image, the two metrics were computed by comparing
the reconstructed image with the original image manipulated by the
same scaling or cropping operation.
The results of PSNR and SSIM for different reconstruction
setups are shown in Table 1. For comparison, we also include the
PSNR and SSIM of original images recompressed in JPEG with a
quality factor of 75 as baseline. From the results, one observes the
average PSNR and SSIM of reconstructed images from secure
JPEG transmorphing are 45.08 dB and 0.987, which would be
considered practically lossless in the signal processing community.
With different transformations applied on the transmorphed
images, reconstructed images still preserve significantly high
quality, with PSNR and SSIM scores higher than that of the
original images compressed in JPEG (QF = 75). As the rotation
operation by JPEG transcoding is lossless, the quality
measurements of corresponding reconstructed images are identical
to that of images reconstructed without transformation applied. For
P3, image reconstructed without transformation is lossless. With
scaling and compression applied, the reconstruction quality is
slightly worse than our method. This is because lossy image
transformations may severely affect the DCT coefficients of P3
public and secret images, which decreases the precision of P3
reconstruction. 
4.3 Storage overhead
To evaluate the storage overhead, we manually created ten mask
matrices representing different ROIs of increasing area (from 10 to
100% of the entire image area) and applied secure JPEG
transmorphing on each image with respect to each ROI, without
and with DCT requantisation applied (QF = 90, 80, 70, 50 or 30).
As JPEG decoding and re-encoding may affect image file size, we
directly inserted the sub-image into the original JPEG image
instead of creating the actual obfuscated image to diminish such
impact. This is equivalent as if we assume the applied image
obfuscation does not change the image file size. We also applied P3
[12] protection on each image, using four different threshold values
(1, 5, 10 and 20). The definitions of storage overhead for secure
JPEG transmorphing and P3 are given by the following equations,
respectively:
S IT − S IO
S IO
and
S IP3Pub + S IP3Sec − S IO
S IO
, (1)
where IO denotes the original image, IT is the transmorphed image,
IP3Pub/IP3Sec the public/secret part of P3 protected image and S( ⋅ ) the
operator to get image file size.
The storage overhead was computed for each protected image
and results over all images (mean and 95% confidence interval) are
presented in Fig. 7. From the result, a near linear relation between
storage overhead and area of protected ROI is observed for
different setups of secure JPEG transmorphing. Without DCT
requantisation applied (TM.Original), the overhead of JPEG
transmorphing is considerably higher, which is due to the sub-
image data inserted. With DCT requantisation applied (TM.QF=n),
such overhead is significantly reduced, e.g. by over 40% with
TM.QF = 80 compared to the case without overhead control. The
overhead of P3 is in general lower than that of JPEG
transmorphing when applied on the entire image region. Yet, the
major purpose of using JPEG transmorphing is to protect regional
image information, instead of obfuscating the entire image. For
instance, by applying secure JPEG transmorphing on 40% of the
entire image using QF of 80 or 70 in DCT requantisation, the
overhead is only between 20 and 30%, which is acceptable in
practise considering that JPEG image compressed with QF of 70 or
80 usually maintains fairly high quality. 
5 Subjective evaluation of regional image
obfuscation
A previous study [24] reveals that obfuscating just face region may
not offer adequate protection to privacy against automatic person
recognition carried out by deep neural networks employing visual
cues from context information disclosed by other image regions
Table 1 Mean PSNR (dB) and SSIM of reconstructed images from JPEG transmorphing and P3 without and with
transformations applied on protected images
Method Without transformation With transformation:
Sc. Cr. Co. Ro.
secure JPEG transmorphing PSNR 45.08 39.37 42.94 37.59 45.08
SSIM 0.987 0.975 0.979 0.951 0.987
P3 PSNR Inf. 37.46 43.27 35.53 inf.
SSIM 1 0.968 0.993 0.925 1
baseline JPEG compression (Q = 75) PSNR 36.32
SSIM 0.9444
 
Fig. 7  Storage overhead of secure JPEG transmorphing and P3
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unprotected. This challenges our method which is designed mainly
for regional visual privacy protection. However, the degree to
which different types of regional visual obfuscations can preserve
users’ privacy against real human ‘attacking’, namely recognition
by humans, has not yet been well studied. Moreover, most visual
obfuscations create unreadable or highly distorted image regions,
the impact of which on users’ pleasantness has not been identified.
Therefore, we conducted a set of subjective experiments via
crowdsourcing to investigate (i) the privacy protection capability
and (ii) the pleasantness of regional image obfuscations.
5.1 Privacy protection capability
5.1.1 Methodology: We devised a novel subjective experiment
where ‘attackers’ were put in a simplistic social networking
scenario to evaluate the performance of different regional image
obfuscations against person recognition from real human. The
experiment was carried out by employing online subjects to act as
attackers to recognise protected persons in images obfuscated by
different visual protection methods in different setups. The lower
the recognition rate is, the stronger the method is supposed to
protect privacy. Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) [https://
www.mturk.com/] was used as the crowdsourcing platform.
We selected six identities (adult male) from the PIPA dataset
[22] as protection and recognition targets each having four images
served as the evaluation set. We then applied seven obfuscations on
three ROIs (defined in Section 4.1) of each target identity in each
evaluation image, respectively. The seven obfuscations are
described in Table 2. To increase the recognition difficulty, we
selected another three identities in addition to the six identities
such that subjects were required to identify protected target from a
total of nine candidates. We designed three experiment setups to
model different scenarios of person recognition ‘attacking’ in the
context of social media. The three scenarios and corresponding
setups are described in Table 3. The complete set of 24 evaluation
images (in both original and protected versions) and all reference
images of the 9 individuals (for both within-context and across-
context scenarios) are available at http://grebvm2.epfl.ch/lin/
privacy/privacy_dataset.zip. Fig. 8 shows the evaluation images
and two sets of reference images of an example target. 
5.1.2 User study based on crowdsourcing: We conducted three
subjective experiments on AMT with the above setups,
respectively. Every experiment was divided into three sessions,
each showing evaluation images with only one type of ROI
protected. Every human intelligence task (HIT) of AMT presents
six protected evaluation images and an extra image unprotected
serving as ‘honeypot’ to help us remove sloppy subjects. Each
image is associated with a question asking subjects to identify the
target by selecting one from the nine candidates. The option ‘I
really don't know’ can be selected if subject has no any clue about
the protected person. For within-context and across-context setups,
the ‘honeypot’ images were randomly selected from the reference
images. For without-context setup, ‘honeypot’ images were only
selected from the three extra identities apart from the six identities
under evaluation. In such a way, the unprotected ‘honeypot’ images
do not reveal any information about original evaluation images.
For within-context and across-context setups, reference images of
all nine candidates are presented in the beginning of each HIT and
made always available during the experiment for subjects’ review.
Fig. 9 shows the screenshot of an image being evaluated in an HIT
of AMT. All HITs were published on AMT with the following
constraints satisfied:
• Six images evaluated in an HIT belong to six targets,
respectively.
• The order in which the six targets and applied obfuscations
appear is random.
• Each image or HIT is rated by at least seven different subjects.
• Every subject can take unlimited number of HITs within a
session but cannot participate in more than one session.
Finally, after filtering out outliers who answered ‘honeypot’
questions incorrectly, we collected responses from a total of 241
subjects, each rating 39.2 images on average. 
5.1.3 Results and analysis: Fig. 10 shows the average
proportion of correct, incorrect, and ‘I don't know’ answers over all
images in the evaluation set, with respect to different recognition
scenarios and protection ROIs. First, one observes that the
recognition accuracy (proportion of correct answers) of within-
Fig. 8  Reference and evaluation image sets of an example target
 
Table 2 Visual privacy obfuscations applied in privacy
evaluation
Name Description
SCRB.H high-level secure JPEG Scrambling [15]
SCRB.M medium-level secure JPEG Scrambling [15]
P3.t = 5 regional P3 [12] protection with threshold 5
P3.t = 20 regional P3 [12] protection with threshold 20
blur image blurring with radius of 8
pixelate image pixelation with block size of 8
mask visual masking with a smiley sticker on head or a grey
rectangle on upper-/full-body region
 
Table 3 Person recognition scenarios and corresponding
experiment setups
Scenario Description Experiment setup
Within-
context
person
recognition
The attacker has rich prior
knowledge about the
protected target, e.g. the
target's public photos in his
online profile or the
memory about the target if
the attacker meets the
target often.
Four unprotected images
of each target are provided
to subjects as reference
(called reference set). The
protected targets in
evaluation set have similar
or the same context
(dressing, event, people
nearby or environment) as
their reference set.
Across-
context
person
recognition
The attacker has
somewhat prior knowledge
about the protected target,
but less straightforward,
e.g. the target's public
photos in a different photo
album of different context
information from the
protected images.
Subjects are provided with
a different set of reference
images (four images/
target) that have
significantly different
context information about
the protected target
(dressing, event, people
nearby or environment)
from the evaluation set.
Without-
context
person
recognition
The attacker has limited
prior knowledge about the
protected target, e.g. a
very vague memory about
the target's facial
appearance.
No any reference image is
provided and subjects
need to identify the
protected target based on
only merely profile head
pictures of the nine
candidates.
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context scenario remains high in most cases: For images with only
head or upper-body protected, recognition accuracy against most
obfuscations is above 60%; while for full-body protected images,
the accuracy is significantly reduced, but still well above the level
of random guess. The performances of all the seven obfuscations
are comparable, with blur and pixelate showing slightly worse
protection to privacy. We admit that in the case where direct
context information about the protected person is available,
regional visual obfuscation may not provide reliable privacy
protection. 
In the scenario of across-context recognition, overall
recognition accuracies are greatly reduced. In turn, the proportions
of incorrect and ‘I don't know’ answers are significantly raised.
The accuracies corresponding to most methods such as JPEG
scrambling, P3 and visual masking are lower than 20%. While the
accuracies for blur and pixelate protections are obviously higher
than the others, because the two methods still disclose certain low-
resolution visual information about the original image region.
As for the without-context scenario, recognition accuracies are
further reduced: the proportions of correct answers for protection
methods including JPEG scrambling, P3 and visual masking are all
below 10%. However, the accuracies for blur and pixelate are still
higher than 20%. Among all the seven obfuscations, mask and P3.t 
= 5 provide the strongest protection against recognition, which is
reasonable as masking operation completely hides the visual
information behind the mask and a strong level of P3 protection is
visually similar to a grey mask.
5.2 Pleasantness
5.2.1 Methodology: The second subjective experiment aims at
understanding the pleasantness aspect of regional image visual
obfuscations. First of all, we give the definition of the term
‘pleasantness’, which are considered in twofold: (i) Perception
Pleasantness (users’ perceived feeling when observing a photo
obfuscated by a particular method) and (ii) Usage pleasantness
(users’ preference to use a particular method to protect their own
photo privacy). To measure perception pleasantness, we apply the
Valence model in psychology with 9-Point SAM scales [25], where
1 stands for very unpleasant, 9 for very pleasant and the middle
point 5 for neutral emotion. We use the three-level preference
scales (i.e. ‘dislike’, ‘neutral’ and ‘like’) to model usage
pleasantness. The subjective experiment was therefore conducted
by gathering the two types of pleasantness responses on different
visual protections as perceived by online subjects.
Ten visual protection obfuscations (listed in Table 4) were
selected for comparison. An example image obfuscated by the ten
methods is shown in Fig. 11. We selected 13 images from the PIPA
dataset [22] and applied the 10 obfuscations on an individual's head
region in each image, thus resulting in 130 different protected
images [All images (original and protected) are available at http://
grebvm2.epfl.ch/lin/privacy/pleasantness.zip]. For each protected
image we asked 25 different subjects on AMT to vote on the
perception and usage pleasantness. We removed the results from
one subject who provided constant answers. Finally, 105 unique
subjects participated in our experiment, each voting on 30.95
images on average. Screenshot of an example HIT on AMT is
given at http://grebvm2.epfl.ch/lin/pleasantness_AMT.png. 
5.2.2 Results and analysis: For each protected image, we
computed its mean opinion score (MOS) of perception
Fig. 9  Screenshot of HIT presenting an image under evaluation
 
Fig. 10  Proportion of ‘I don't know’, incorrect and correct answers across
all images, with respect to different protection methods and regions. ‘H’,
‘U’ and ‘F’ annotated on each bar indicates head, upper-body and full-
body, respectively
 
Fig. 11  Example image protected by the ten visual obfuscations
(a) SCRB, (b) P3, (c) Pixelate, (d) Blur, (e) Black, (f) Smiley, (g) TearsJoy, (h)
SnapGhost, (i) Vendetta, (j) C-Stamp
 
Table 4 Ten visual privacy protection methods
Name Description
SCRB high-level JPEG Scrambling
P3 regional P3 [12] protection with a threshold of 20
Pixelate image pixelation with block size of 20
Blur image blurring with radius of 20
Black visual masking in black colour
Smiley visual masking with a ‘smiley’ Emoji
TearsJoy visual masking with a ‘tears of joy’ Emoji
SnapGhost visual masking with a Snapchat Ghost logo
Vendetta visual masking with a cartoon Guy Fawkes mask
originally from the film V for Vendetta
C-Stamp visual masking with a grey stamp showing
‘CONFIDENTIAL’
 
Fig. 12  Results of subjective pleasantness measurements
(a) Perception pleasantness, (b) Usage pleasantness
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pleasantness across ratings from different subjects. The MOSs of
all 13 images corresponding to each protection method are shown
as boxplot in Fig. 12a. From the result, one observes that pixelate,
blur, smiley and TearsJoy Emoji provide significantly higher
perception pleasantness scores than the others: the MOSs of
pixelate, blur, smiley and TearsJoy are mostly above 5.0, indicating
positive emotions; while other obfuscations reveal only negative
emotions with average pleasantness scores below 5.0. Among the
ten methods, JPEG scrambling (SCRB) and P3 provide the lowest
perception pleasantness. We believe this is because image
pixelation and blurring generate the most natural visual effects
while the two Emoji stickers are the most enjoyable and amusing
ones among all the methods. On the contrary, the two distortion-
based approaches, JPEG scrambling and P3, can only result in the
most unattractive visual effects. Interestingly, image stickers such
as the SnapGhost and Vendetta still reveal relatively low
pleasantness, though funny and interesting. The other two methods,
Black masking and C-Stamp, generate similar level of perception
pleasantness as SnapGhost and Vendetta.
As for usage pleasantness, Fig. 12b shows the overall
proportions of votes for ‘dislike’, ‘neutral’ and ‘like’ of each
protection method. Again, the two Emoji stickers smiley and
TearsJoy obtained the most votes for ‘like’, above 60 and 55%,
respectively. Pixelate and blur also received a large number of
votes for ‘like’ (35 and 51%), and at the same time a large number
of votes for ‘neutral’ (both around 30%). This time, the Vendetta
mask got a considerable proportion of votes for ‘like’ and the
smallest proportion of votes for ‘neutral’. Compared to SnapGhost
and C-Stamp, Vendetta received the same number of votes for
‘dislike’, indicating that the Vendetta mask is prone to being either
liked or disliked by people. In addition, the other methods all
received much less votes for ‘like’. Among all the ten methods, the
two distortion-based obfuscations, JPEG scrambling and P3, again
received the largest number of votes for ‘dislike’, indicating the
disadvantage of distortion-based obfuscations.
6 Conclusion
This paper presents secure JPEG transmorphing, a flexible
framework for protecting image visual privacy in a secure,
reversible and personalised manner. Secure JPEG transmorphing
allows one to apply arbitrary regional visual manipulation on
image ROIs, while secretly preserving the information about the
original ROIs in application segments (APPn markers) of the
visually obfuscated JPEG image. The protected image (or
transmorphed image) has the same syntax as standard JPEG and is
therefore backwards compatible with JPEG. With a dedicated
JPEG transcoder or decoder that supports JPEG transmorphing, the
original image can be recovered by replacing the obfuscated
regions in the protected image with the corresponding original
regions extracted from APPn markers. As arbitrary regional image
manipulation can be applied, the proposed method provides a
significant flexibility and usability such that users can choose their
preferred ways to protect any sensitive image regions while still
preserving its reversibility. This is the most distinctive
characteristic of the proposed method compared to the others. In
secure JPEG transmorphing, sensitive information represented in
the sub-image is encrypted before being inserted. Therefore, the
security of the proposed solution mostly relies on the encryption
scheme applied. The security analysis is out of the scope of this
paper.
With secure JPEG transmorphing, images of near lossless
quality (compared to original image) can be reconstructed from
protected image even if the latter has been manipulated by lossy
transformations, e.g. scaling, cropping and compression. Inserting
additional transmorphing data in JPEG image causes overhead to
image file size but such overhead can be modulated by the
proposed overhead control mechanism without affecting the
reconstruction quality. Both facts are verified in our objective
experiments.
Regional image obfuscations may not offer the perfect
protection to privacy in certain scenarios as unprotected regions in
image may still reveal private information, it is reliable enough in
cases where unprotected image regions do not disclose
straightforward context information about the protected target that
matches other public information of that target. This is proven in a
subjective experiment carried out via online crowdsourcing.
Last but not the least, we conducted another subjective
experiment using crowdsourcing to investigate the pleasantness of
different image obfuscations. Results indicate that distortion-based
visual protections (e.g. JPEG scrambling and P3) may not provide
the optimal pleasantness from both perception and usage
perspectives. Instead, more intuitive, personalised and still
reversible visual protection can be achieved using the proposed
secure JPEG transmorphing.
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